Tenth Schedule and Anti-Defection Law: Political Stability vs Opportunistic Defections in India

The Tenth Schedule was introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, to curb political defections and promote stability in elected governments. While it has significantly reduced individual defections, organised defections, delayed adjudication, and excessive reliance on party whips continue to challenge its effectiveness. This article examines the objectives, achievements, limitations, landmark Supreme Court judgments, and the way forward regarding the Anti-Defection Law.

Introduction

• The Tenth Schedule, inserted through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, seeks to curb political defections and promote stability in elected governments by disqualifying legislators who voluntarily give up party membership or violate the party whip.
• It was further strengthened by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, which abolished the one-third split exception and retained only mergers supported by at least two-thirds of legislators.
• Despite these reforms, frequent political realignments and judicial interventions indicate that the law has only partially achieved its objective.

I. Tenth Schedule’s Contribution to Political Stability

1. Discouraged Frequent Individual Defections

• Reduced the era of "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" politics by imposing disqualification on legislators who defect for personal or political gains.
• Enhanced government stability by discouraging opportunistic floor-crossing that previously led to frequent collapse of governments.
• Example: The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act (1985) was enacted following widespread defections witnessed during the 1960s and 1970s.

2. Strengthened Party Discipline and Legislative Stability

• By enforcing party whips, the law ensures coordinated legislative action and prevents instability during crucial votes.
• It promotes continuity in governance by preventing shifting political loyalties from destabilising elected governments.
• Case: In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule while allowing judicial review of the Speaker's decisions.

3. Strengthened by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act (2003)

• The amendment removed the exemption for one-third splits, making individual defections more difficult.
• Inserted Article 75(1A) and Article 164(1A), limiting the size of the Council of Ministers at the Centre and States to 15% of the House strength.
• Inserted Articles 75(1B), 164(1B), and 361B, preventing defectors from becoming Ministers or holding remunerative political offices until re-election or expiry of their legislative term.

II. Why the Anti-Defection Law Has Failed to Curb Opportunistic Defections

1. Institutional Bias and Delayed Adjudication

• The Speaker or Chairman decides disqualification petitions, raising concerns over impartiality as they often retain political affiliations.
• Delays in deciding petitions allow defecting legislators to continue in office for months or even the full legislative term, weakening the deterrent effect of the law.
• Case: In Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker (2020), the Supreme Court observed that disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months.

2. Organised Defections Through the Merger Provision

• Political actors increasingly engineer mass defections satisfying the two-thirds merger requirement, thereby escaping disqualification.
• The law has shifted opportunistic politics from individual defections to organised political bargaining.
• Example: In Maharashtra (2022), Eknath Shinde and more than two-thirds of Shiv Sena MLAs claimed protection under the merger provision, leading to a prolonged constitutional and political crisis.
• Case: In Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), the Supreme Court emphasised the Speaker's responsibility in determining the "real political party" during internal party disputes.

3. Weakening Representative Democracy

• Frequent issuance of party whips restricts legislators from expressing independent views even on ordinary legislation, limiting deliberative democracy.
• Legislators also circumvent the law by resigning first and re-contesting elections under another political party.
• Example: In Karnataka (2019), several MLAs resigned from the ruling coalition, leading to the fall of the government. Though they were disqualified, many later contested by-elections on another party's ticket and became Ministers.

III. Way Forward

• Establish an independent adjudicatory authority such as the Election Commission or a Constitutional Tribunal to decide disqualification petitions within a statutory time limit.
• Mandate automatic vacation of the seat when a legislator resigns from the political party on whose ticket they were elected, requiring a fresh electoral mandate before joining another party.
• Restrict the operation of the party whip only to confidence motions, no-confidence motions, Money Bills, and votes affecting government stability, as recommended by the Dinesh Goswami Committee and the Law Commission.
• Strengthen internal party democracy to accommodate legitimate dissent while preventing opportunistic defections.

Conclusion

The Tenth Schedule has undoubtedly reduced rampant individual defections and contributed to governmental stability. However, organised defections, delayed adjudication, and excessive party control continue to undermine its effectiveness. A balanced framework combining independent adjudication, time-bound decision-making, electoral accountability, and greater legislative autonomy is essential to uphold constitutional morality, strengthen representative democracy, and preserve both political stability and democratic dissent.