India’s Aviation Safety: From Reactive Responses to Proactive Reform?

Aviation safety requires a forward-looking, risk-based framework that emphasizes accident prevention through strict regulations, transparent investigations, continuous training, and independent oversight. While India’s global aviation safety ranking improved from 102nd to 48th after the 2022 ICAO audit, recent high-profile accidents, including the tragic June 12, 2025 Air India Dreamliner crash and the Kozhikode runway overshoot (2020), highlight serious structural and cultural deficiencies.

Regulatory Oversight and Lack of Structural Independence

• Conflict of Interest: The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), set up in 2012, and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) operate under the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA), raising questions about impartiality. In contrast, railway accidents are independently investigated by the Commissioner of Railway Safety.
• Ignored Committee Reports: The JK Seth Committee (1997) identified critical gaps in safety regulation, yet its recommendations remain largely unimplemented.
• ICAO Audit Gap: Despite scoring 85.5% compliance with safety protocols, India’s high rate of recurring incidents suggests that ICAO audit findings haven't translated into on-ground change.

Investigation Culture and Lack of Transparency

• Pilot-Blaming Bias: Accidents like Kozhikode (2020), Mangaluru (2010), and Aurangabad (1993) were attributed mostly to "pilot error," with limited accountability extended to infrastructural or procedural failures.
• Judicial Misuse: AAIB’s technical findings are often used by police or courts as evidence of criminal guilt—contradicting the international "no-blame" approach meant for safety learning.
• Lack of Public Accountability: Unlike the Charkhi Dadri (1996) collision, which led to the implementation of collision-avoidance systems, many recent AAIB recommendations lack follow-up or public disclosure.

Infrastructure Gaps and Systemic Safety Deficiencies

• Runway Safety: The absence of Runway End Safety Areas (RESA) was a direct cause in incidents like Kozhikode. Though flagged by the CASAC post-Mangaluru report, corrective action has been slow.
• Human Factors & Fatigue: Human error incidents have risen by 10%, yet implementation of Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) remains patchy and reactive.
• Training & Technology: While DGCA reports a drop in technical mishaps (e.g., 25% fall in airprox events), rapid pilot promotions, ATC understaffing, and post-COVID skill decay compromise safety.

Recommendations for a Preventive Aviation Safety Model

• Independent Regulation: Shift the AAIB and DGCA to an autonomous, Parliament-backed body free from MoCA influence.
• No-Blame Investigations: Legally separate AAIB’s technical findings from judicial use unless vetted independently, to prevent scapegoating pilots.
• Flight Safety Ombudsman: Set up an independent redressal body to enforce accountability, ensure transparency, and uphold passenger and crew safety.
• Embed Safety in NCAP: The National Civil Aviation Policy (NCAP) must integrate safety measures deeply—training, infrastructure, fatigue management, and psychological support for crew.

Conclusion

India’s improving ICAO rank and absence of major fatalities in 2023 are promising. However, a reactive, post-accident model continues to dominate aviation safety. Without fundamental reforms in oversight independence, investigative transparency, and preventive infrastructure planning, India’s aspiration for global aviation leadership will remain grounded.

Shifting from reactive fixes to a holistic, preventive safety regime will not only reduce future tragedies but also elevate India’s credibility in global aviation governance.