India’s Arctic Policy: Why a Passive Approach Could Undermine Its Strategic Presence in the Polar North

The Arctic region, long perceived as a bastion of peace and scientific collaboration, is transforming rapidly into a theater of high-stakes geopolitical contestation. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Arctic is warming almost four times faster than the global average. This accelerated warming is melting polar ice, opening up critical new navigation channels such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR).

The Arctic Council, which comprises eight Arctic states and thirteen observer nations—including India—was founded on principles of cooperation. However, recent developments like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s Polar Silk Road, and renewed U.S. interests in Greenland have heightened geopolitical rivalry in the region.

India released its Arctic Policy in 2022, emphasizing climate science, sustainability, and international cooperation. However, experts suggest that this policy lacks strategic and commercial depth, risking India’s marginalization in Arctic governance and emerging trade networks.

Strategic Significance of the Arctic Region in Global Politics

Resource Competition and Energy Geopolitics

• The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic contains 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of untapped natural gas. The Yamal LNG project—a collaboration between Russia and China’s CNPC—underscores this competitive energy rush.
• China’s Polar Silk Road, part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is developing Arctic shipping routes and infrastructure. This intensifies fears of a China-Russia Arctic axis.
• Meanwhile, the EU’s 2021 Arctic Policy stresses the region’s potential for critical raw materials and green energy, potentially sidelining late participants like India.

Emergence of New Trade Routes

• Melting Arctic sea ice is making the Northern Sea Route operational for up to six months, reducing shipping times between Asia and Europe by 40%—a potential threat to the Indian Ocean’s economic centrality.
• Maersk Line’s 2018 trial shipment along the NSR validated its commercial viability.
• India’s maritime strategies, such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), could become redundant if Arctic routes, particularly those dominated by Russia and China, gain global traction.

Rising Militarisation and Strategic Posturing

• Russia has reactivated over 50 Cold War-era Arctic military bases, including those in the Franz Josef Land archipelago, and has also deployed nuclear-powered submarines.
• Simultaneously, NATO’s Cold Response 2022 exercises point to growing Western military interest in the Arctic.
• The U.S. Department of Defence Arctic Strategy (2023) describes the Arctic as a “strategic buffer” zone, essential to global security infrastructure.

Technological and Digital Sovereignty

• Arctic nations are investing in digital infrastructure, including undersea cables, surveillance systems, and satellite connectivity.
• Projects like the Arctic Connect—a joint venture between Finland and China—aim to link Europe to Asia via digital highways through the Arctic.
• India’s Arctic Policy has no concrete provisions for participation in this emerging digital architecture, increasing the risk of exclusion from future technological standards-setting in the region.

India’s Current Arctic Posture — Achievements and Gaps

Scientific Presence and Soft Power

• India’s Himadri Research Station in Svalbard, Norway, established in 2008, is a milestone in its polar scientific efforts. India also participates in Arctic expeditions and contributes to global climate models via the Ministry of Earth Sciences and NCPOR.
• Although India is a signatory to the Svalbard Treaty, its Arctic engagement remains largely scientific and lacks strategic intent, limiting its role in geopolitical dialogues.

Observer Role in Arctic Council

• India has been an Observer in the Arctic Council since 2013, which permits participation in discussions but not voting rights.
• The Arctic Council’s function has been weakened following the Ukraine conflict, leading to new, informal governance forums. India’s observer role is now inadequate for shaping emerging rules.
• India’s non-participation in Arctic Frontiers 2024, a key Arctic policy summit, reflects strategic aloofness from critical geopolitical discussions.

Arctic Policy 2022: Vision but Limited Scope

• The 2022 policy is built around six pillars including scientific research, connectivity, and cooperation. It emphasizes the Arctic-Himalaya climatic linkage, crucial for understanding monsoons and water security.
• However, the policy sidesteps military or strategic concerns, omitting focus on areas like shipping regulation, resource governance, and digital sovereignty—all vital in Arctic diplomacy.

Strategic Disconnect with Nordic Countries

• India’s neutrality on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to unease among Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland), which may impact mutual trust and diplomatic capital.
• Despite India’s commitment to strategic autonomy, it must actively engage diplomatically to reassure Arctic partners.
• Post-2022, no bilateral Arctic strategic agreements have been signed with Nordic nations, reflecting missed opportunities in diplomacy and commerce.

The Way Forward for India — Reinventing Its Arctic Approach

Strategic Institutionalisation

• India should establish an Integrated Arctic Cell within the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence for cross-domain policy coherence.
• This institutional framework should coordinate with NITI Aayog, ISRO, Indian Navy, and private stakeholders, enabling a multi-sector Arctic strategy.
• India should also initiate a dedicated Think Tank Forum on Arctic Affairs—similar to the Raisina Dialogue—in partnership with ORF and NIAS.

Dual-use Partnerships and Infrastructure Collaboration

• India must forge partnerships with Arctic nations on dual-use infrastructure: maritime domain awareness, polar navigation systems, and satellite-based surveillance via ISRO.
• Trilateral logistics initiatives—like India-Japan-Norway—can mirror models such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.
• India must also conduct joint Arctic search and rescue (SAR) drills and training in polar operational scenarios.

Diplomatic Engagement in Arctic Governance

• India should proactively engage in emerging Arctic platforms related to the blue economy, digital connectivity, and logistics governance.
• It must push for Observer+ or Partner status in upcoming Arctic frameworks, aiming for deeper decision-making roles.
• India should integrate Arctic narratives into UNGA, WTO, IMO, and other multilateral platforms, showcasing itself as a responsible polar stakeholder.

Sustainable Development and Local Engagement

• India should propose an India-Arctic Indigenous Exchange Program for knowledge-sharing in climate resilience and renewable energy.
• India can export its solar and clean-tech models—like those promoted under the International Solar Alliance (ISA)—for Arctic settlements.
• A low-footprint Arctic diplomacy modeled on Canada’s engagement with indigenous communities could help India build trust and cooperation at the grassroots level.

Conclusion

• India’s Arctic posture, founded on climate science and soft power, is increasingly insufficient in a rapidly securitized and commercialized polar arena. With great powers vying for influence, India’s low-engagement policy could exclude it from key decisions on trade routes, digital infrastructure, and security dynamics.
• A 2024 SIPRI report indicates that over 60% of global maritime innovation investments will involve Arctic linkages—India cannot afford to remain on the sidelines.
• India must now develop an integrated Arctic strategy that blends scientific diplomacy with strategic foresight, and sustainability with commercial agility, to actively shape the rules of the polar order—rather than just observe them.